This article examines the presence of the reference price effect in mergers and acquisitions in Russia, which can act as a distortion in investor perception of the influence a deal has on a company. In this study we use the Russian market as a laboratory for the investigation of behavioral effects in a relatively inefficient market. We find a relationship between the acquirer's announcement period return and the proximity of its pre-announcement share price to the 52-week high. The 52-week high serves as a salient anchor even though it is economically irrelevant for valuation purposes. This effect appears to be stronger for deals associated with higher levels of uncertainty. The findings confirm the presence of the anchoring bias in evaluating the effect of a merger or acquisition announcement by Russian investors. We demonstrate a significant anchoring effect even for deals with a blocking (>10%) or a controlling stake (>25%) in an emerging market with a highly concentrated ownership.
Introduction
A significant amount of research has been conducted on stock market reactions to merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements. Although classical financial theory predicts that all new relevant information is almost instantaneously incorporated into a company's share price, empirical evidence provides considerably different results. One of the sources of these distortions in price is the subjectivity of investors to a range of behavioral biases. The present paper is devoted to the study of one such biases -the anchoring effect -in Russia in the context of its influence on the acquirer's M&A announcement period return.
The anchoring bias is a process whereby individuals in situations of uncertainty tend to make decisions that are strongly influenced by easily available reference points although they are objectively irrelevant to their current task (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . The presence of the anchoring effect was found in finance as well, as it is necessary to deal with many numbers and make judgments based on these numbers. Therefore, people rely on salient reference points as a shortcut, instead of finding a proper foundation for their decision, requiring time and cognitive effort. This bias undermines the usually-assumed rationality of investors, especially when it comes to the perception of stock prices and the information they should incorporate. In recent years there have been a number of studies on the significant dependence between investor behavior and the proximity of stock prices to their historic highs. In particular, a growing number of researchers claim that the 52-week high is an important reference point for investors.
The intuition behind this relationship is that investors take a shortcut and attempt to assess whether the information on a firm's qualitative and quantitative characteristics is already incorporated into its stock price -or whether it may increase further. The 52-week high, in a way, represents a reference "maximum" point that is readily available to investors. Even if positive news is released, investors are likely not to bid up the price, since it already reflects the information; negative news does not lead to much bidding-down. The importance of a peak price as an anchor has been confirmed in various fields of study, such as exercising stock options number of studies revealed that the 52-week low also is a significant factor; however, the historic high has always had a stronger influence (George and Hwang, 2004 ). This paper focuses on the relationship between the suggested anchor and the stock price reaction to the announcement of M&A deals. The reaction of the market to such announcements has been studied quite extensively. However, the vast majority of the literature on this topic focuses on studying fundamental company variables, since the main determinants of market price change with respect to a deal announcement. These include: the quality of management performance that there is a significant relationship between offer premiums paid for target firms and their recent peak prices such as the 52-week high. As this price level is economically irrelevant, the authors suggest it is the applied reference point.
Additional evidence on the anchoring effect in M&A deals was described in Ma et al.
(2016).
They analyzed the connection between the acquirer's announcement return and its 52-week high and found a reference price effect. They studied 19,119 deals 1981-2014 , in which the acquirer company was a US publicly traded firm. The main result is that acquirers earn higher announcement period returns when their share price before the acquisition announcement is significantly below the 52-week high, and a lower return when it is relatively near the 52-week high. The authors explain this phenomenon as a reference price effect: investors perceive the 52-week high as an anchor. Another important result is that this reference price effect was found to be stronger in deals with greater levels of uncertainty, such as deals with private targets, for which it is more difficult to find information and conduct a proper evaluation. The literature presents enough evidence that greater uncertainty may strengthen the anchoring effect (Tversky Based on the these articles we expect to find a more significant anchoring effect in analyzing M&A deals in the Russian market, since it is less efficient than the US market. We test the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1. The anchoring bias exists in the Russian market via the reference price effect; the acquirer earns a significantly higher announcement period return if the stock price prior to announcement is well below its 52-week high.
Hypothesis 2.
The anchoring effect increases with higher levels of uncertainty associated with the deal.
The results of this study contribute to the literature in three ways. First, they document that Russian investors are subject to such behavioral bias as the anchoring phenomenon, which has been previously proven for developed markets only. Second, it provides evidence for the fact 6 that uncertainty strengthens the effect of the anchoring bias. Third, it shows that the bias depends neither on size of the acquired stake despite the high concentration of ownership in the market nor on the fact that control over the company is purchased.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the idea of anchoring bias. Section 3 presents the data, variable description and model specifications. Section 4 reports the empirical results, robustness checks and discussion. Section 5 concludes.
What is the anchoring bias?
The anchoring bias is an information-processing bias, first defined by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), the founders of behavioral economics. They conducted several experiments to show that when people need to make estimates or provide judgments, they are frequently biased to some initial value, which can be either given or obtained as a result of a computation. Investors go through a two-stage process -they create an anchor and then adjust their final decision based on this anchor. For a lower anchor, people will end up with a lower result and vice versa. Therefore, different initial points can lead to variations in the final result, although they are irrelevant to the main question.
For example, in one of the original experiments people were asked to answer different numerical questions aimed at estimating values in percentages, such as the share of African countries in the United Nations. Firstly, they were given a number between 0 to 100, and were asked to say, whether, in their opinion, the answer to the basic question is higher or lower than the given number. Then they were asked to give their final answer to the main question. All people were divided into two groups and received two different initial values. They were asked to compare the answers with the initial value: 10% or 65%. People from the group with a lower initial value, ended up with a significantly lower estimate, than people from the other group: who answered 25% and 45% respectively.
Another experiment included two groups of high school students, who were asked to provide an estimation of the product of given numbers from 1 to 8 within 5 seconds. The first group received the equation with numbers listed in increasing order (from 1 to 8), while the second group received the same expression in the opposite order (from 8 to 1). As it is difficult to estimate precisely within the given time limits, people had to make some adjustments. As a result, people from the first group ended up with a significantly lower median estimate (512) However, it is of paramount importance to account for people's prior knowledge of the question.
Wilson et al. (1996)
conducted an experiment including 116 students divided into two groupsone receiving an anchor and a control group -and were asked to compare the received number (for the first group) with their answer to the question on how many countries were in the United Nations. After that students had to write down their answer to the question (for both groups) and evaluate their prior knowledge on this question. The results showed a substantial anchoring effect in the first group among students with low levels of knowledge, while for people with high knowledge the difference between the group with an anchor and the control group was insignificant.
This finding provides a rationale for examining the presence of the anchoring bias in finance.
This started to attract researchers' attention only relatively recently. Financial agents, such as investors, managers and institutions, frequently act in situations of high uncertainty and with little knowledge of future market performance. Therefore, we can expect them to be subjected to the anchoring bias, which has been shown in empirical studies. For example, Campbell and Sharpe (2009) discovered the anchoring effect in expert consensus forecasts of monthly economic releases, which were found to be biased towards the previous months results.
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)
showed the presence of the anchoring bias in individual investment decisions. Analyzing Finnish stock holdings, the authors found that less sophisticated investors, such as households or non-profit organizations, tend to base their investment decisions based on whether the stock is at its monthly high or low. Investors are more willing to buy stocks that are at a monthly low and sell stocks that are at a monthly high level. The anchoring bias was also found by Heath et al. (1999) in stock option decisions They analyzed a sample of more than 50,000 employees in seven companies listed on NYSE and NASDAQ. The authors discovered that option holders exercised 97% more options than on average when the stock price exceeded its previous year's maximum. The choice of a one-year period for the maximum price is 8 connected to the availability of this information as the financial press usually reports 52-week highs.
One of the areas in finance in which investors need to make judgments on events having limited knowledge is M&A. Malhotra et al. (2016) using a sample of deals from 50 countries found that management, when deciding on the share of equity ownership in an international firm, is biased towards the most recent level of equity purchased by another foreign company in the same country and industry. They pay less attention to other important information, overestimating the influence of the anchor. The authors also showed that the anchoring effect appears to be stronger for transactions associated with higher levels of uncertainty. They approximated deal uncertainty by the relatedness of the buyer and the target in terms of industry and the political stability of the country in which the target company operated.
The present paper is also devoted to the anchoring effect in M&A. As a reaction to M&A announcements, investors start trading the company's shares, based on their perception of the effect of this deal. This changes the share price, which results in a return for the company after the announcement. Nevertheless, as the consequences of the deal and potential synergies for the companies are in most cases extremely difficult to evaluate, the existence of the anchoring bias is hypothesized 3 Data & Methodology
Data
The sample was constructed based on data from Bureau van Dijk (Zephyr), Mergermarket and Bloomberg and consisted of M&A deals with acquirers which were publicly traded Russian companies 2000-2017. The Bureau van Dijk and Mergermarket databases were used for collecting data about M&A deals and the characteristics of the target (e.g. information about deal financing, target listing status, the country of the target). The deal set was adjusted for deals repeated in both databases. The Bloomberg database was used for collecting market and financial information about the acquirer -its share prices for cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and reference price ratio (RPR), market capitalization, total assets and total equity values and market index data required for calculating CAR. The list of variables used in the analysis can be found in Table 1 in Appendix.
Our initial sample consists of 903 unique deals, which was then restricted to 387 deals after application of several filters. We first excluded observations with deal values of less than US$1 million. Second, we excluded deals in which the acquiring company was unlisted on the announcement date and one year before the announcement (this accounts for the most significant reduction in the number of observations). Third, deals from the financial sector were excluded because some financial characteristics do not have the same meaning for them as for nonfinancial firms (for instance, leverage). We also reduced the number of observations by excluding deals with missing data on the structure of deal financing, the ownership before the deal, and the acquired stake.
The distribution of deals throughout the period is presented in Figure 1 in Appendix. The overall dynamics reflect the changes in M&A activity -an increase before 2008, a drop after the crisis, then a recovery until 2015 and another decrease afterwards (IMF Country Report, 2016).
However, this does not represent the full picture because of the restrictions imposed for our sample, in particular, the elimination of all the deals in which the acquirer was not listed one year before the announcement. This restriction limits the number of deals in the earlier years of our sample, which is why the presented figures do not capture high levels of growth of the Russian M&A market prior to the crisis of 2008.
Overall, the Russian M&A market differs substantially from the M&A markets of developed countries which makes it more attractive for the present analysis. The market is highly concentrated -a relatively small number of large deals usually represents a major share of the total deal value, and a substantial number of deals during recent years were conducted by companies in the energy and extractive industries. Another important point specific to the Russian M&A market is the role of the government both as a regulator and as an initiator of deals via state-owned companies 4 .
Compared to the developed markets, the Russian M&A market is also characterized by having less information available on deals, especially smaller ones, and the information is of lower quality. Moreover, deals usually take a longer period of time for deal completion after the announcement than in developed markets because of, for instance, the longer registration processes 5 . This reduces the investor's ability to accurately predict the outcome of a deal on the company's future value.
Variables

Dependent variable
In our analysis we use CAR as the dependent variable to measure the return the acquirer receives estimations showed the insignificance of narrow event windows in our sample (see Table 2 in Appendix).
In our sample, CAR was estimated over the event window [-20 , +20] using the MICEX Index as a market index for the market model. Values ranged from -71.35% to 56.96% with the average of -1.93% and the median of -1.64%.
Main independent variable
The reference price ratio (RPR) is the ratio of a company's share price on a chosen date to its 52-week high. It was proposed by George and Hwang (2004). In our analysis RPR is calculated on the 21 st day prior to a M&A announcement to be consistent with CAR calculations. If the company's share price is relatively close to its 52-week high 21 days before the announcement, RPR will be close to 1. For a negative and significant effect of RPR over the acquirer's CAR we will be able to identify the presence of the anchoring bias -the closer the acquirer's share price to its 52-week high, the lower the CAR. This would imply that the market anchors the acquirer's share price to its 52-week high, which does not incorporate any relevant information about the company.
In our sample there is a range of RPRs calculated against each deal on the 21 st day prior to the M&A announcement from 0.16 to 1. The average value is 0.87, which means that on average the acquirer's stock price 21 days before the announcement, is 87% of its 52-week high. 
Control variables
The set of control variables includes the deal characteristics and market and financial data on the acquirer. The deal-related variables include the relative size of the deal, the type of financing, the relatedness of the target and the buyer in terms of geography and industry, whether the deal was organized as a tender offer, whether the target is a listed company or not, and the share of the target which the acquirer held prior to the deal. Characteristics of the acquirer include its size, leverage and market to book ratio. All these variables can have an influence on the acquirer's return and have been controlled for. We also included yearly dummy variables to control for the time effect.
In our sample, 21% of deals were financed purely by cash and 10% purely by stock. Overall, the average structure of deal financing is similar to the one described by Table 3 in Appendix.
Model specification
The basic specification we use to estimate the linear model constructed based on the 
The description of the variables used in the model can be found in Table 1 in Appendix. For the time effect control we group the deals conducted before the global financial crisis in 2008 due to the small number of observations available for every year during this period.
To adapt the model to the features of an emerging market we replaced the market to book ratio with Tobin's Q ratio. This parameter was shown to be significant for M&A deals in emerging markets (Grigorieva and Grinchenko, 2013). Then we accounted for state ownership in the acquiring companies which is a traditional measure for emerging markets with significant government participation.
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On the basis of the existing results we expect to find an anchoring effect stated in a negative RPR coefficient, which would confirm Hypothesis 1. We also expect a stronger effect for the subsample of unlisted targets which can be explained by the uncertainty associated with such deals.
Empirical results
Basic results
Presence of the anchoring bias
We compared CAR for observations with high and low levels of RPR (above or below the sample median RPR level, respectively). For CAR estimated by the event window of [-20, +20] the difference between average values for low and high RPR values is significant and equal to 4.02% (see Table 2 in Appendix). Higher levels of CAR for low levels of RPR provide evidence for the presence of the anchoring bias in the Russian market.
Then we conducted OLS regression analysis. We estimated several models with various combinations of control variables (see Table 4 in Appendix). Overall, the effect of RPR over CAR appears to be negative and statistically significant for all model specifications. It is also economically significant as it shows that a one standard deviation increase in RPR leads to around a 3.5% decrease in CAR. Unfortunately, the effect cannot be However, in the research on the US market such a long event window was not used. This is due to the higher efficiency of the US market compared to the Russian market, as a result of which, less time is needed for new information about the company, such as an M&A deal announcement, to be incorporated into the stock market.
The dummy variable for the acquisition of control during the deal was insignificant. Therefore the acquisition of control of the target company does not significantly affect CAR. The
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interaction term between RPR and the control dummy was also insignificant (see Model 5) , while the RPR itself remained significant. This implies that the reference price effect does not depend on whether the deal results in the acquisition of control (the situation when regardless of the initial stake, the final stake of the acquirer would be more than 50%). This means that investors are affected by the same bias while evaluating the effect of the announcement of purchasing both control and minority stakes in the target company.
Nor was the dummy variable for government-owned companies significant. This could show that investors perceive both government-owned and non-government-owned companies in the same way, thus government ownership does not affect the return. On the other hand, the insignificant coefficient for government ownership could indicate that this variable affects the return in both directions. For example, some investors see government-owned companies as riskier due to sanctions and do not expect high returns from them and the weaker economic performance of state-owned enterprises may be driven by non-economic goals of such companies, such as employment or social issues (Goldeng et al., 2008) . However, the issue is still debatable. Jakob (2017) showed for a wide range of countries there is no significant difference between the performance of state-owned and privately-owned companies. In addition, some investors may view government-owned companies as assets with a low level of uncertainty and a low level of risk, which makes them more attractive for portfolio diversification.
The model was also checked excluding the lowest 10% of RPR values. The effect remained negative and significant. This indicates that the result is not driven by outliers as the RPR distribution is negatively skewed. The result is available upon request.
Valuation
The presence of a negative dependence between CAR and the closeness of the acquirer share price to its 52-week high may be a result of the influence of the company's value. If the share price is close to its 52-week high, then the possibility that the company is overvalued is higher.
To control for this effect, we included the variable market-to-book ratio and Tobin's Q ratio in the regression models. Following Ma et al. (2016), we estimated different models for subsamples with high and low levels of market-to-book ratio (above and below the median, respectively). The results are presented in Table 5 in Appendix. Although there is a difference in the coefficients obtained for the two subsamples (and the difference is statistically significant by the Chow test), there is a negative and significant effect for both subsamples.
14 The same approach was implemented for subsamples with high and low Tobin's Q ratios. Again, negative and significant coefficients appeared for both subsamples, which indicates that the dependence found reflects the anchoring effect.
The model was also tested on a sample of transactions paid purely in cash. Since overvalued companies tend to use stock as a method of payment for acquisitions (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003), companies that pay in cash are not expected to be overvalued. As there are only 82 such transactions in the sample, we were not able to include the full list of control variables. Therefore we modeled the dependence of CAR over RPR only, and still found a negative and significant coefficient. This confirms the anchoring effect. The result is available upon request.
Uncertainty
To test the second hypothesis -that the observed effect increases with uncertainty -we applied different approaches.
First, we assume that the deals in which the target is not a listed company are associated with higher levels of uncertainty among investors as they do not have access to as much financial information about the company as for listed companies. Therefore, we estimated the model separately for subsamples of listed and unlisted targets (see Table 6 in Appendix). The influence of RPR over CAR was insignificant for the subsample of listed targets and the difference between the two models was significant according to the Chow test. Although the small number of observations may be a problem for such a long list of independent variables (there were only 53 deals with listed targets in the sample), the effect remains insignificant if we regress CAR only over the RPR for this subsample.
Another approach is to test the uncertainty hypothesis by including the interaction terms between the RPR and the variables which are usually connected with uncertainty. The first variable represents a stock payment for the deal as for such deals it is more difficult to evaluate the overall effect on the acquirer's fair value. Another variable is the relative size of the deal, as The results are presented in Table 6 in Appendix. The significant and negative interaction terms between the RPR and stock payment and volatility indicates an increase in the anchoring effect for deals with higher uncertainty. The interaction term between RPR and the relative size of the deal was insignificant. This can be explained by the fact that large deals usually get more media coverage, reducing uncertainty, which overlays the effect of increased deal complexity.
Overall, the results indicate that the anchoring effect increases with uncertainty for the Russian market.
Different levels of acquired control
The model was also estimated for subsamples of different cutoffs for acquired control. Model 1 in Table 7 in Appendix represents the result for the whole sample, Model 2 for the subsample of a more than 10% stake and Model 3 more than 25%. In developed markets with more dispersed equity holdings a stake of 10% can be a blocking stake and a stake of 25% can be a controlling stake, as it can give control over the company with a right to veto in cases where the other 75% of shares is distributed among a large number of investors, and such deals are relatively rare. In our sample almost in 75% of the deals (290 deals out of 387) a stake of more than 25% was acquired.
In all models the coefficient of RPR is negative and significant, illustrating that the effect is present in deals in which large and small stakes were acquired. It could be argued that the dependence of the size of the analyzed effect on the cutoff level should be larger for deals of larger stakes. With a higher level of control, the acquirer is able to influence the target's business to a greater extent and realize more potential synergies. However, it is usually difficult to estimate the exact effect of potential synergies, which increases the uncertainty level. On the other hand, deals in which the control is acquired usually get more media coverage which reduces the level of uncertainty.
Although the coefficient for RPR becomes more negative with increasing cutoffs for the acquired stake (from Model 1 to Model 3), the difference among these coefficients, by Z test 
Robustness check
Alternative measures for CAR
As mentioned in Section 3. 
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In addition to our main approach we used different event windows to estimate CAR. However, The results are presented in Panel A of Table 8 in Appendix (Model 1, 2 and 3, respectively).
The effect appeared to be negative and significant for the longest event window and in the basic approach, where the market model was used for the estimation of normal returns. Although the coefficient is smaller in comparison with the basic approach, it is still statistically and economically significant. The result is robust to alternative CAR estimations.
Alternative anchors
To check the robustness of the results we also used different approaches to estimate RPR. First, we estimated the ratio of the acquirer's share price prior to the announcement to its 13-, 26-and 39-week highs (which represents 1, 2 and 3 quarters, respectively). The results are presented in Panel A Table 9 in Appendix. In all specifications the effect remains negative and significant.
Almost half of the observations (180 out of 387) of the 52-week high were the same as the price 13-week high (1 quarter), which could be a signal that some investors use different peak prices as anchors.
We then estimated RPR by dividing the acquirer's share price before the announcement into 75%, 90% and 95% percentiles of the share price rather than the 52-week high. The results, which can be found in Panel B of Table 9 in Appendix, show that the anchoring effect is present for all approaches to the RPR estimation.
We also included the ratio of the price to its 52-week high and 52-week low. The coefficient of RPR estimated by the 52-week low was negative and significant, which supports the anchoring hypothesis -if the share price before the announcement is highly above its 52-week low (which means that the price is close to its 52-week high), then the acquirer obtains a lower return. Then, Table 9 in Appendix.
We also calculated RPR with regard to the Russian market index (MICEX), to check whether the effect is driven by the closeness of the whole market to its 52-week high (see Model 3 in Panel C of Table 9 in Appendix). However, the coefficient for the market index RPR was insignificant.
In general, the reference price effect was shown to be robust. 17 
Discussion
The results demonstrate that Russian investors are prone to behavioral biases, in particular the anchoring bias, in evaluating the effect of an M&A announcement on the acquirer's share price. Whether the anchoring bias is stronger in emerging markets in comparison with the developed markets is a subject for further research.
Another area for discussion is the logic behind choosing the 52-week high of the acquirer's share price as the anchor. In this case peak prices such as a 52-week high, represent a salient point, or an anchor. What distinguishes it from other peak prices, such as, for example, peak prices of the latest quarter or half year, is that it is usually available for investors in different electronic resources that aggregate financial information about companies. For instance, Bloomberg presents the 52-week high and low on the overview page for every company in line with its market capitalization, volume traded and other key statistics. However, as we showed in Section 4.2.2, peak prices for periods of different lengths can also serve as relevant anchors.
Another possible price level that is available for investors and can act as the anchor is the average price for the previous year. In Section 4.2.2 we demonstrate that the coefficient obtained for the model for the 75% percentile appeared to be more negative than for the 95% percentile when estimating models for different percentiles of the share price. This may be a signal that investors also anchor the share price to its average level.
The choice of market index used for a normal return calculation has also been debated. In our analysis MICEX index was used. One could claim that in a situation of significant changes in a particular industry, which do not influence the MICEX index much, during the time of an M&A announcement from this industry, the calculated abnormal return could be biased. In this case, it would be more appropriate to use industry indices, such as MSCI, which would reflect industryspecific changes more than a general market index. However, there may be several limitations in using MSCI indices for a sample of Russian companies. First, this index is not calculated for all sectors. For instance, there is no Russian MSCI index for the transportation sector, while there are some deals from this sector in our sample. Second, the overall index is not highly diversified (it includes only 22 companies). Some sectors are represented by a small number of companies, at one extreme for instance the consumer staples sector is fully presented by Magnit GDR.
Therefore, for such industries this index would capture company-specific changes rather than industry-specific ones.
Conclusion
This research shows the presence of the anchoring bias through the reference price effect in investor evaluation of M&A deal announcements in Russia. We found a significant and negative relationship between the acquirer's CAR obtained as a result of an M&A announcement and the RPR, which represents the proximity of acquirer's share price before the announcement to its 52-week high. This high serves as an anchor for investors, although this price level is irrelevant for evaluating the effect the deal announcement would have on the company's future performance.
The results indicate that in situations where the company's share price prior to the announcement is relatively close to its 52-week high, the acquirer receives a lower CAR in comparison to situations where the pre-announcement share price is well below its 52-week high.
The bias remains significant even after controlling for the valuation level effect, which means that it is not explained by the investor perception that the companies with a relatively low preannouncement share price are possibly undervalued. Moreover, the reference price effect gets stronger with the increasing level of uncertainty associated with the deal, which generally is in line with behavioral finance theory. The bias also remains significant even after applying different restrictions to the sample regarding the size of the acquired stake and does not strengthen for the deals in which a controlling stake was purchased. The obtained results are robust to various approaches for calculating CAR and the usage of different anchors.
The findings add to existing literature in several ways. First, we showed that investors in Russia are subjected to the same behavioral bias, in our case the anchoring bias, as investors in developed markets. Second, we provided additional evidence that the anchoring effect strengthens with increasing levels of uncertainty. Third, we demonstrated that on average the anchoring bias exists in all deals regardless of the size of the acquired stake and whether the resultant stake is controlling. The deals are divided into 3 subcategories -deals in which a stake of less than 10% was acquired, deals, in which a stake between 10% and 25% was acquired, and deals in which a stake of more than 25% was acquired. < 10% 10%-25% > 25%
